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Abstract
In this article we present the case that the Reasonable Doubt standard is in urgent need of
repair. Our research reveals that a previously-recognized phenomenon arising from
vagueness of the standard is more consequential than thus far realized and creates a
serious equal protection problem. We show that the only legally feasible solution to this
problem is to quantify the definition of the standard. While others have examined
quantified standards, we make a direct case for it and overcome previous objections to it
by offering a way to make it practical and workable.
The solution we envision will require new legislation – we show that the problem
is unlikely to be corrected within the judicial branch. However, we also show that legal
flexibility exists at the U.S. Supreme Court level to permit such a change, and
furthermore that flexibility probably exists to prevent undue chaos in the system by
allowing past verdicts to be “grandfathered.”
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Quantifying Reasonable Doubt: a Proposed Solution to an
Equal Protection Problem
Harry D. Saunders
“To be a meaningful safeguard, the reasonable-doubt
standard must have a tangible meaning that is capable of
being understood by those who are required to apply it. It
must be stated accurately and with the precision owed to
those whose liberty or life is at risk.”
– Justice Harry A. Blackmun1
In this article we present the case that the Reasonable Doubt standard is in urgent need of
repair. Our research reveals that a previously-recognized phenomenon arising from
vagueness of the standard is more consequential than thus far realized and creates a
serious equal protection problem. We show that the only legally feasible solution to this
problem is to quantify the definition of the standard. While others have examined
quantified standards, we make a direct case for it and overcome previous objections to it
by offering a way to make it practical and workable.
The solution we envision will require new legislation – we show that the problem
is unlikely to be corrected within the judicial branch. However, we also show that legal
flexibility exists at the U.S. Supreme Court level to permit such a change, and
furthermore that flexibility probably exists to prevent undue chaos in the system by
allowing past verdicts to be “grandfathered.”
We first summarize the problem and the research that exposes it. We follow this
with a review of prior research and show how our research and arguments are different.
We then review legal precedent that is relevant to this problem, focusing on Supreme
Court precedent as it affects possible changes to the standard. Then we present our
research findings in further detail. After that, we describe why case law is unlikely to
provide a solution, illustrating the problem with a highly instructive case of our
contriving. Then, we go to the proposed solution, arguing that any actual solution will
have to look something like it. Finally, we consider objections to the proposed solution.

The Problem
Some colleagues and I undertook an experiment. In this experiment, we asked
individuals to consider what, to them, “reasonable doubt” means. The experiment was
structured in very precise terms and what it delivered was disturbing. Individuals, in this
case college-educated professionals specifically trained in assessing probabilities for
decision making, revealed radically different interpretations of reasonable doubt – so
different that it calls into critical question what jurors are asked to do when they
deliberate and deliver verdicts. Quite clearly, the reasonable doubt standard, as currently
described to jurors, is so profoundly vague as to be meaningless. A graphical depiction is
given below.
1

Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 29 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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"Beyond a Reasonable Doubt" Interpretation

Figure 1. Interpretations of “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”
The exact nature of our experiment is the subject of a later section, but the results appear
to open wide the constitutional interpretation of equal protection. The evidence is strong
that juries can, and likely do, deliver verdicts that deviate substantially from the
presumed ideal of upholding a standard of proof that is uniform (equal protection) and
objective (due process). Specifically, the results show that two different juries, possessed
of identical beliefs about the likelihood of guilt of a defendant, can easily deliver two
different verdicts based solely on different interpretations of reasonable doubt (equal
protection). And any particular defendant’s fate is in all likelihood far more dependent
on individual jurors’ interpretation of the standard of proof than on jurors’ beliefs about
likelihood of guilt (due process). We argue that this situation raises a profound and
consequential problem with the reasonable doubt standard (as it is currently applied).
We later show that challenges to the existing standard based on due process are
probably legally foreclosed due to precedent, but that equal protection challenges are not.
However, we further show that both are probably foreclosed by practical considerations.
Nonetheless, we also show that introduction of a quantitative definition of the standard is
not foreclosed on either basis.
Equal protection and due process considerations aside, we show in a later section
there is a deep logical problem with, plus a major legal impediment to, allowing jurors to
set their own standard. And short of abandoning altogether the idea of a standard of
proof, we demonstrate that a quantitative standard is the only way to assure that all these
problems do not arise.

The Experiment
In our experiment, we first trained individuals in some basic probability concepts. The
individuals – 130 of them – were participants in corporate training programs designed to
improve the quality of decision making in their organizations. Typically they were
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college graduates, and typically with degrees in engineering or the sciences. The training
was based largely on the discipline of decision analysis, now in widespread use in the
business world and there employed by managers and executives to make decisions with
large resources at stake that are subject to significant uncertainty.
Our experimental design was influenced by our suspicion that many, maybe most,
criminal juries conflate two tasks: determining the likelihood of guilt; and determining if
this likelihood passes the reasonable doubt standard. The first task is one that requires a
functioning human mind, and human judgment, and everything a human being can bring
to the undertaking by way of past experience, discernment, and knowledge of human
nature. The second task, in principle, is much easier. It requires only that individuals
gauge their judgment against an objective standard. In our experiment, this objective
standard was described to study participants using the California jury instruction.2
The training helped participants with the equivalent of the first task. In order to
make good decisions, business decision makers must make assessments of the likelihood
of uncertain events. Modern-day decision makers of major corporations do this
quantitatively. They, or their designates, routinely prepare quantitative probability
assessments of key uncertainties known or expected to influence the success or failure of
the alternatives under consideration. These uncertainties usually involve very complex,
multi-determinate events and contain many so-called “intangibles”: will the Korean
peninsula reunify within the next ten years? Will the economy grow faster than 3% next
year? Will the new drug I am researching be successful? Will my competitor decide to
build a new plant? Will I strike economic quantities of oil if I drill this well? …and so
forth.
We ask the reader at this point to temporarily suspend your disbelief that
individuals can formulate quantified probabilities that are sound; we only mention here
that our methodology enables individuals to specify precise probabilities that they believe
in strongly enough that they would be willing to bet a large sum of money – or their life
if required – that the probability is exactly as they say. Let us also add that we have used
our methods to extract from a superior court judge the likelihood he saw that a jury in a
case he was familiar with (unknown to us) would deliver a guilty verdict – an event we
have heard legal professionals describe as “imponderable.” With our help, this judge was
able to deliver a very precise quantitative declaration of his subjective probability
regarding this future event. Later on, we will explain a tool used by business managers
that enables such precision but is simple enough for a child.
The individuals we trained learned that such probability assessments are
necessarily subjective – others with different information, knowledge or experience
might assess the probabilities differently. But in the business world, as elsewhere,
decision makers must rely on their own beliefs – informed, perhaps, by the judgments of
those around them – because decision makers bear direct consequences of their own
decisions. Decision professionals call such an approach to subjective uncertainty

2

Prior to the recently-adopted new “plain English” instruction to take effect January 1, 2006 (CALCRIM
220, available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/jury/criminaljuryinstructions/calcrim_juryins.pdf). We
believe our results would change in no substantive way were we to use this newly-proposed California
instruction.
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quantification Bayesian, after the 18th century cleric and scholar Thomas Bayes.3 Jurors,
likewise, must make inherently subjective judgments.
Armed with this background, the individuals were asked to place themselves in
the following situation: You (the study participant) are serving on a jury in a murder case.
You are required first to judge, based on the evidence, the likelihood that the defendant is
guilty. You know that you can never be 100% certain of the defendant’s guilt or
innocence, since the only ones who can possibly know for certain are: the victim, the
perpetrator, the defendant (if different from the perpetrator), or an eye witness. None of
these can serve on a legally constituted jury. You have seen the evidence and listened to
the arguments, we told them, and you have reached some judgment of the likelihood the
defendant is guilty. It doesn’t matter what this likelihood is, but you have precisely
quantified it using methods you are now familiar with.
The question before you is: what probability of guilt is sufficient for you to vote a
verdict of guilty? To assist you in this, we will read you the California jury instruction:
“Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt;
because everything relating to human affairs is open to some possible or
imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison
and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the
charge.”4

The participants were asked to put on a piece of paper a single number giving
their interpretation of “beyond a reasonable doubt” – the standard they would use – and
return it anonymously. We recorded the results.
The results are remarkable. Among the 130 participants, the bulk of responses
ranged from 50.0% to 99.999990%. Two individuals reported numbers of 30% and
100% (more about these individuals later). Twenty-five individuals recorded 90%;
twenty recorded 99%. Note that the difference between 90% and 99% is a ten-fold
difference in what they would consider “reasonable doubt” – the difference between a 1%
level of doubt for one person and a 10% level of doubt for another.
The results are reported in more detail later, but the upshot is clear: two different
juries, possessed of identical beliefs about the likelihood of guilt of the defendant, could
deliver different verdicts simply because jurors interpret the standard of proof differently.
We argue that this is violative of equal protection.
It is critical at this point to emphasize that we are not arguing the jury system
itself is violative of equal protection. In fact, our distinctions allow a clarification of the
jury’s role. It is entirely possible and legitimate for two different juries to come to
different verdicts on the same facts. This is a simple, unavoidable fact of the jury system.
Determining the likelihood of guilt of a defendant is necessarily a subjective undertaking
and will always be so. It is the standard itself, against which jurors must measure their
subjective beliefs, that we claim assails equal protection.
It is notable that all participants, despite their differences about what the standard
should be, rationally could weigh their subjective judgments of guilt against such a
standard if – but only if – it were quantified precisely.
3

Thomas Bayes, Essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of chances, 54 PHILOSOPHICAL
TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON, at 296 (1764).
4
CALJIC 2.90, available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/documents/before_after.pdf .
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Previous Research
Our research is similar to that of previous researchers, but different in important ways.
Seminal work by Simon and Mahan 5 explored the idea of quantifying jurors’ judgments
of likelihood of guilt, and additionally surveyed judges, prospective jurors, and students
as to their quantitative interpretation of the reasonable doubt standard. Like us, they
observed a large variance among those surveyed and they additionally reported
significant discrepancy between judges’ and jurors’ interpretation of the standard. Unlike
us, they used a 1 to 10 scale instead of percentages and so did not uncover the differences
at the high end of the range we later show to be crucially important. Nor did they
explicitly draw the conclusions from their results that we would draw. Nonetheless, their
research strongly supports our case.
Others have done similar research aimed either at directly assessing jurors’
implied reasonable doubt standard or inferring it from mock jury experiments. An
excellent reference summarizing these studies is found in Hastie6 who reported that
“…estimates of the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard in criminal cases ranged from .51
to .92”7 [on a scale of zero to one – equivalent to 51% to 92%]. It is important to note
that none of these studies used individuals trained in assessing subjective probabilities.
In our case, we used individuals specifically trained in assessing subjective probabilities
for use in business and personal decisions, using methods developed by decision analysts.
We argue that such individuals, employed by companies that routinely require employees
to quantify uncertainties for actual decision making, are much more credible than
untrained individuals when it comes to reliably quantifying their beliefs.
An important contribution to the field comes from Kagehiro & Stanton,8 who
offer evidence that quantified standards of proof are superior to verbal descriptions of
these standards because they have the intended effect of altering verdicts in the right
direction as the standards are made more or less strict, whereas the verbal standards do
not. Included in Kagehiro & Stanton’s article is an excellent rebuttal9 to objections
against quantified standards of proof raised by Tribe10 that we recommend to the reader.
While Kagehiro & Stanton do not argue for quantification of the standards, they do argue
that their results call for re-examining the current verbal definitions.11 We go a step
further and argue that the reasonable doubt standard must be quantified. We augment
this argument with a way to do this practically – politically, legally, and workably for the
individual juror – and we present the case that to do otherwise violates equal protection
and due process.

5

Rita James Simon & Linda Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A View from the Bench, the Jury, and
the Classroom, 5 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 319 (1971).
6
Reid Hastie, Algebraic Models of Decision Processes, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR
DECISION MAKING 84, 101-108 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993).
7
Id. at 101.
8
Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions of Standards of Proof, 9 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 159 (1985).
9
Id. at 174-175.
10
Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L.
REV. 371 (1971) and Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1329 (1971).
11
Kagehior & Stanton, Supra note 8, at 175.
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Recently a school of thought has arisen that argues against quantifying reasonable
doubt on the grounds that it precludes needed flexibility in jury decision making. This is
an important development and requires explicit attention. Stoffelmayr & Diamond12
argue that the merits to leaving the reasonable doubt standard vague are that jurors can
adjust their verdict to reflect the severity of the offense and the costs associated with
error. Similarly, Lillquist13 argues that juries will require more proof in some cases than
in others, that jurors probably apply utilities to wrongful and rightful decisions that reflect
those of society, and that the flexibility to consider outcomes specific to the case being
decided is preferable to a fixed standard of proof.
But here is the problem with their reasoning: while these researchers adhere to
solid principles of decision theory, they do not adhere to principles of the law. The
difficulty is that current law prohibits jurors from considering the consequences of their
verdict and instructs them only to weigh the evidence. By way of example, the model
jury instructions for the Eighth Circuit say, “You may not consider punishment in any
way [emphasis ed.] in deciding whether the Government has proved its case beyond a
reasonable doubt.”14 The Ninth Circuit instructions are identical to this,15 and the
Eleventh Circuit instructions are almost identical.16 The Fifth Circuit instructions say,
“You should not be concerned with punishment in any way. It should not enter your
consideration or discussion.”17 The Sixth Circuit states it even more strongly: “It would
violate your oaths as jurors to even consider the possible punishment in deciding your
verdict.”18
This practice is commonly carried through to the state level. For instance, the
Judicial Council of California’s recommended instructions include the statement, “You
must reach your verdict without any consideration of punishment.”19 Hawaii includes an
instruction that penalty or punishment is not to be discussed.20
For these researchers’ proposal to work, jurors must be able to consider the
utilities of possible outcomes from their verdict (wrongful or rightful acquittal; wrongful
or rightful conviction). We show mathematically in Appendix A that this is logically
impossible if they are barred from considering punishment. The plain English version of
12

Elisabeth Stoffelmayr & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Conflict between Precision and Flexibility in
Explaining “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt,” 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 769 (2000).
13
Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 85 (2002).
14
MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT (2000
EDITION) 3.12, available at http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/rules/criminal2000.pdf.
15
NINTH CIRCUIT MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (2003 EDITION) 7.4, available at
http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/web/sdocuments.nsf/criminal+jury.
16
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) (2003 EDITION) 10.1, available at
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/documents/jury/crimjury.pdf.
17
FIFTH CIRCUIT DISTRICT JUDGES ASSOCIATION PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) (2001
EDITION) 1.20, available at http://www.lb5.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions/crim2001.pdf.
18
SIXTH CIRCUIT CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (2005 EDITION) 8.05, available at
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/crim_jury_insts.htm.
19
CALCRIM 200 available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/jury/criminaljuryinstructions/calcrim_juryins.pdf.
20
HAWAI’I CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 8.01, available at http://www.courts.state.hi.us (follow this
sequence of hyperlinks: “Legal References”/“Internet Resources”/“Jury Instructions”/“Hawai’i Civil and
Criminal Jury Instructions”/“Hawai’i Criminal Jury Instructions”).
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this proof is that, without being able to consider punishment, jurors cannot logically, or
legally, trade off the social utilities/disutilities of wrongful vs. rightful verdicts.
Mathematics aside, we argue that weighing the social utility of rightful verdicts
vs. the disutility of wrongful ones properly, and legally, belongs in the hands of state
legislators, not in the hands of individual jurors. Even where punishment is not explicitly
mentioned, most courts emphasize that jurors must confine themselves to the evidence
before them and most jury instructions contain directives such as that contained in the
Eighth Circuit’s instruction: “[Y]our verdict must be based solely [emphasis ed.] on the
evidence and on the law which I have given to you in my instructions.”21 It is difficult to
escape the conclusion that most jury instructions legally preclude jurors from considering
anything about the individual or social costs and benefits of their decisions (including for
example the cost of releasing a murderer back to society or convicting an innocent
person). The clear sense of most or all jury instructions is that jurors should weigh only
the evidence, and be pure “finders of fact,” not arbiters of social utility.
However, to be fair to Stoffelmayr & Diamond and Lillquist, the method for
creating a sensible standard at the state level should involve considerations and
methodology precisely as they propose. In setting the standard of proof, legislators will
need to consider both the social utility of rightful verdicts and the disutility of wrongful
ones. Importantly, part of what motivates these researchers’ call for flexibility is that
society likely places different utilities on verdicts for different crimes. Ironically,
however, the very nature of quantifying the standard (as we suggest) enables exactly this
– different quantified standards could be applied to different classes of crimes.
Even if we exclude consideration of utilities by jurors, there exists a logical
conundrum. One might argue that jurors should nevertheless determine the standard of
proof themselves, based on their interpretation of the jury instruction. Objection # 3 in a
later section explains why this is infeasible. Briefly stated, the problem is that jurors, if
they are aware of the phenomenon underlying our results, cannot rationally assign
meaning to the reasonable doubt standard.
On a final note, it is instructive to look at the reaction of judges to the idea of
quantifying the standard as reported by Simon and Mahan. They cite a representative
judge’s reaction as follows:22
“Percentages or probabilities simply cannot encompass all the factors, tangible
and intangible, in determining guilt – evidence cannot be evaluated in such
terms.”

This statement is patently false, and bespeaks a (probably widespread)
unfamiliarity in the legal community with the modern tools of decision analysis.
Individuals can be readily trained to quantify their subjective uncertainty about the most
subtle and complex of situations replete with so-called “intangibles,” and corporations
count on this ability daily.

21

MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
EDITION) 3.12, supra note 14.
22

DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT (2000

Rita James Simon & Linda Mahan, Supra note 5, at 329.
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Legal Foundations
Legal Non-foreclosure of a Quantitative Standard and Foreclosure of Challenges to
the Existing Standard
A key question is whether quantifying the reasonable doubt standard falls afoul of – or is
indeed precluded by – legal precedent. In this section we address that question and also
examine whether there is legal foundation for challenging the current application of the
standard.
Because our results, we claim, challenge both due process and equal protection,
we address both issues. We begin with due process.
The United States Supreme Court found, in the landmark case Victor v.
Nebraska,23 that aside from certain specific phraseology such as “moral certainty” some
justices found troubling, the most commonly used jury instructions on reasonable doubt
did not violate the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court’s
focus was narrowly on due process; equal protection was not addressed in these cases.
Importantly for us, there is nothing in this ruling that of necessity precludes the
substitution of another standard for the current standard. Simply because it has not found
the current standard to be violative of due process does not mean the Court would find a
different standard (and to be specific, a more precise version of the same standard) to be
violative of it. Accordingly, if the standard were quantified, the Supreme Court would
not be bound by precedent in any challenge to it on due process grounds.
Importantly for our proposed solution, the Court here explicitly affirmed that the
use of any reasonable doubt definition is neither compelled upon the state courts, nor
prohibited them: “The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due
process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt
nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.”24 They only require that if a jury
instruction is given, that, “ ‘taken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly conve[y]
the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.’ ”25
The Court’s ruling in Victor v. Nebraska would appear to foreclose a challenge to
the current standard on due process grounds, although clearly the Court did not have
evidence such as ours in hand, nor would the underlying cases in question necessarily
have called for it. In fact, our results do challenge the due process viability of the
standard in a fundamental way, but, even aside from the Court’s implied recognition in
the Victor v. Nebraska ruling of the standard as currently applied, there is the intimidating
challenge of finding any actual means of obtaining clarity on this question through the
courts. Our data do show an arguably lethal-to-due-process span of different
interpretations of “reasonable doubt.” And on this basis a rational argument would be
that taken as a whole, the instructions do not “correctly convey the concept of reasonable
doubt to the jury,”26 accordingly violating due process. But that is only an argument, not
a case.
Only two possibilities exist: One, a case can be found that on the facts alone is so
directly and clearly condemnatory of the current use of the reasonable doubt standard that
23

Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994).
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (O’Connor, J., writing for the majority).
25
Id. at 5 (O’Connor, J., quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954)).
26
See id.
24
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it compels change. We argue that such is unlikely, and later show the fanciful nature of
attempting to construct such a case. Or two, one could envision interviewing jurors who
had reached a verdict, using methods like ours to demonstrate that they carried different
interpretations of the reasonable doubt standard. The problem with this idea is that
jurors’ interpretation of the standard could inadvertently be corrupted by their
adjudicating the case. Once an individual has reached a verdict of, say, guilty, he or she
might be reluctant to admit they could have convicted against a loose standard that
perhaps calls into question their judgment, or even their decision, and the interview
process would in all likelihood convey this possibility to the individual. We argue that
this is an impractical alternative.
That was due process. While the United States Supreme Court has ruled on other
equal protection issues that are jury process-related,27 it has not ruled on equal protection
issues surrounding the reasonable doubt standard. This means, in the first place, that
there is no precedent that would require the Supreme Court to prohibit use of a
quantitative standard based on equal protection considerations. It means, in the second
place, that the door is technically open to a challenge to the current standard on equal
protection grounds.
However, as with due process, we argue that equal protection is not practical to
preemptively litigate absent an actual change in the standard. As it happens, the practical
challenge here is even greater than for due process.
One could attempt to find a case that works on the facts alone, but, as above, we
believe this unlikely. The second possibility would require the courts to allow a highly
controlled experiment in an actual, unadjudicated case involving outside access both to
jurors themselves and to a “sample” jury pool, who also view the proceedings as
hypothetical jurors. This would be necessary to develop data on the differences between
potential juries; to make a case it would also require real jurors deciding a real case. We
argue that this possibility is unlikely, too.
There is precedent for courts attempting to apply a quantitative definition of
reasonable doubt. In McCullough v. Nevada, the Nevada Supreme Court overturned a
district court ruling where the trial judge provided jurors a numerical description of
reasonable doubt that on a scale of ten defined reasonable doubt as “seven and a half, if
you had to put it on a scale.” 28 However, the Nevada Supreme Court did not find the
attempt by the trial judge to clarify the reasonable doubt standard to by itself be reversible
error. Rather, the ruling was based in part on the finding that the instruction “may
impermissibly lower the prosecution’s burden of proof,”29 and the finding that the
instruction “is reversible error when coupled with [emphasis ed.] any other attempt to
supplement, change, or clarify the statutory reasonable doubt definition.”30 Thus, this
finding was by no measure a condemnation of applying a quantitative definition, in and
of itself.
In summary, at no point has the U.S. Supreme Court or any other court in the
United States made any ruling that closes the door to a quantitative standard. As for
27

For instance, Johnson v. Louisiana 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (where the Court upheld a Louisiana law
requiring less-than-unanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases).
28
McCullough v. State, 657 P.2d 1157, 1157 (1983).
29
Id. at 1159.
30
Id. at 1158.
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challenging the current application of the standard, it is theoretically possible to challenge
it on equal protection grounds, and possibly even due process grounds, but we do not
believe it is practical to do so.
Attempts to Clarify the Standard
It is worthwhile describing attempts by the courts to bring further clarity to the
reasonable doubt standard. The method has been to accord different phrases different
probabilistic weights. (Within quotations in this paragraph, italicization is ours.) In Cage
v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court found that “[i]t is plain to us that the words ‘substantial’
and ‘grave,’ as they are commonly understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is
required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard.”31 They also, as noted
previously, expressed deep concern with use of the term “moral certainty.” On the other
hand, the Court took no issue with “near certitude” being used in instructions to describe
beyond a reasonable doubt: “As used in this instruction … [the language] …‘impressed
upon the factfinder the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude in the guilt of the
accused.”32 The Court also described this as “the very high level of probability required
by the Constitution in criminal cases.”33 It further allowed that the use of “strong
probabilities” was appropriate so long as “ ‘it emphasized the fact that those probabilities
must be so strong as to exclude any reasonable doubt.’ ”34 Justice Ginsberg in her
separate opinion complained that if these words “save this part of the instruction from
understating the burden of proof, see ante, at 19, they do so with uninstructive circularity.
Jury comprehension is scarcely advanced when a court ‘defines’ reasonable doubt as
‘doubt…that is reasonable.’ ”35 About the only thing the “reasonable doubt” standard
apparently requires is that the doubt must be reasonably constructed, however improbable
the chain of events involved in that construction.
The core problem with all this drawing of verbal distinctions and parsing of words
is that defining the standard in words will never suffice. Defining one set of words in
terms of a beguiling but equally vague set of other words will not overcome the issue our
results uncover, and only buries the problem deeper. The standard needs quantification.
Despite huge instinctive aversion to our proposal to quantify the standard, we believe
most legal professionals will come to terms with it once they understand that is not so
difficult to implement as they might imagine and once they see a change is inevitable.
There may be those who oppose losing the ability to subtly sway the definition of
reasonable doubt in a jury’s mind. But their loss will be a gain for jurors, who will now
have greater clarity on what is being asked of them. Our proposal actually removes a
burden from the juror. For those who understand how it works, converting one’s deeply
held beliefs into a quantified probability is an easy and quickly accomplished task. The
much harder task for a juror is actually developing that belief in the first place.
Removing from the juror any confusion about the standard they must apply would make
their most important task – determining the likelihood of guilt – an easier one to focus on.
31

Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990).
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 15 (1994) (quoting their opinion on Jackson v. Virginia 443 U.S. 307,
315 (1979)).
33
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 15 (1994) (quoting Dunbar v. United States, 156 U.S. 185, 199 (1895).
34
Id. at 22.
35
Id. at 25.
32
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Overall, it would not be as problematic as some may think to institute a modernized
quantitative definition of reasonable doubt.
In fact, there may be little choice. Any thoughtful individual cognizant of the
phenomenon underlying our results can reasonably argue that they can never serve on a
criminal jury. Such a person, knowing the vastly different interpretations that can
(“reasonably”!) be put on the standard, is left to ask “which one should I choose?” “…or
does the jury instruction allow me to choose my own standard that I think best reflects the
norms of society?” Since this latter, as argued above, is not legally available to them,
such a person is stuck. He or she cannot rationally execute the duty asked. As more
individuals understand this dilemma, the jury system’s very functioning is at risk.

The Experimental Results, in Detail
The degree of the problem is substantial. Both the range of responses and the certainty
with which each participant initially held that they understood the reasonable doubt
instruction make the findings extraordinary.
The graphical depiction of our results was shown in Figure 1, above. Aside from
the worrisome range of results, it is worth observing the differences at the high end of the
range. Each step up, from 99% to 99.9% to 99.99% and so on, is a ten-fold change in the
level the person assigns to the meaning of the phrase complementary to “beyond a
reasonable doubt,” namely “reasonable doubt.”
The highest number recorded,
99.999990%, corresponds to a level of reasonable doubt comparable to errors reported for
DNA analysis. This is surprising because one would normally expect in a real case that
the overriding source of uncertainty might be chain of custody or other considerations
that call into question the veracity of the DNA evidence as presented – the veracity of the
reporting expert, for instance.
One might protest that had we asked participants to report their understanding of
“reasonable doubt” instead of “beyond a reasonable doubt” we would have found the
results to be different. But if so, this only reinforces the case: without a quantitative
criterion, the standard is even more prone to conflicting interpretations than our results
suggest. Jurors will be in conflict with themselves if the two choices of wording lead the
same person to different interpretations of the standard. They will also likely be in
conflict with the reasoning of fellow jurors. There is no way to tell, short of a clear
directive from the bench, which of these two ways others may be interpreting the
instruction. Depending which phrase they choose as their focus, some could be
interpreting it one way and others another.
Either way – whether “beyond a reasonable doubt” or “reasonable doubt” – there
is a problem.
A word about some extreme, and revealing, data points. One individual reported
a 30% value (not shown on the chart). Our initial response was to ask this person if they
really meant to say 70% because they had been measuring “reasonable doubt” instead of
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” The person responded adamantly that, no, this is exactly
what they meant: if someone is charged with murder, they actually are more likely to be
guilty than not guilty, and therefore the standard for releasing suspected murderers should
be very high. This of course flies in the face of the presumption of innocence
requirement, which had been explained to participants, but this person argued that in his
homeland (Nigeria), this is not what he would deem a prudent presumption. Another
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individual, an African American, argued the opposite. He had reported 100% (not shown
on the chart). It had been explained to him that 100% certainty is an impossibility for a
participant in a legally constituted jury. Yet he persisted in his declaration that he would
have to be absolutely sure the person was guilty to vote for conviction. He had seen too
many instances, he said, where evidence had been concocted, and police had lied, to
believe any person before him in a courtroom had actually committed the crime.
Therefore, he said, the standard should be set at the highest extreme (and at a level we
would still argue, by the way, is infeasible.)
These examples, to us, indicate very forcefully that interpretation of society’s
norms to establish the clarified standard should be done to the extent possible in a way
that reflects local cultural norms. Especially where liberty or life are at stake, the
threshold likelihood of guilt for letting guilty defendants free or the innocent be convicted
should be determined by the deepest beliefs of the community upon whom the crime, or
alleged crime, has been inflicted and upon whom the standard will be imposed.
Supporting this contention, governing constitutional authorities for declaring an
explanation of reasonable doubt, within certain broad limits, reside at the state level.
To complete the background of our experiment, a description needs to be given of
the exact methodology we taught participants to use. Participants had been trained in the
use of a “probability wheel,” a device used by decision analysts to elicit quantitative
values for subjective probabilities. The precise procedure for using this device is detailed
in an appendix, but in a few words the method presents subjects (participants learned to
use themselves as subjects) with a choice rather than requiring from them a direct
numerical evaluation. This is what makes it easy for people to use. The choice is
constructed in such a way that the subject is presented with a hypothetical decision
involving a very large monetary prize (or in another method, the possibility of losing
one’s life). The choices the subject makes, as the wheel is adjusted to represent different
“lotteries,” lead a subject to a point of indifference between two particular alternatives.
At that point a numerical probability is automatically extracted from the subject – one
that the individual himself has implicitly chosen, and the validity of which he would
attest to with his money (or his life, in the other method). Note that participants did not
use the probability wheel to generate their interpretation of the standard; it was used only
to show them they could precisely quantify a judgment of likelihood of guilt to measure
against the standard.
We refer the reader to the appendix for a further description, but it is important to
note that training individuals to use this tool is not hard. We have trained people from
many different walks of life to use it in a very short time, including an eleven-year-old
girl. Once they understand the concept, individuals become very comfortable and facile
with it. Use of this, and other similar tools, could be taught in any high school or even
middle school.

Why Case Law will not Provide a Solution
It would be appealing to rely on case law to force a solution. But as argued before,
practicality dictates that, short of a case that can be decided on a unique set of facts, the
solution needs to be found elsewhere. Here we explain why such a case, barring an
extraordinary circumstance, will not be brought to the courts.
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The difficulty is that the facts of the case would have to be a very precise.
Because jurors come to their decision by performing two tasks – determining the
likelihood of guilt and seeing if this passes the standard – to test the standard it would
have to be a case where the probability of guilt is explicitly and precisely determined.
We have tried to construct cases where this prevails, but have come up virtually emptyhanded. To describe the difficulties, we present a case of our constructing that, fanciful
as it is, would meet the criterion of precise determination of the probability of guilt. But
we use it to argue that its very fancifulness is strong indication that a case fitting the
criterion is highly unlikely to come before a court.
Here is the case: John Q. is a gambler with a bent for taking dangerous risk. He
has come upon a secret club that promises him an unequalled thrill, and unequalled risk.
He is told to appear at a particular place and enter a room. There he will be presented
with a life-and-death game. On a wall facing him is an opaque window with a hand-size
hole. Above it is a screen, giving instructions and showing a roulette-type wheel. He is
asked to study the wheel and then, if he agrees to the game, to proceed to put his hand
through the hole and fire a gun at someone. The game is this: he is presented with a
wheel, partly red and partly blue. The red part covers precisely 30% of the wheel and
represents the likelihood that, if he continues the game, the gun he will discharge will be
loaded with live ammunition and will kill a live human being. The gun he will discharge
will be given him when he reaches his hand through the hole. This gun may contain only
blanks, or it may contain live ammunition, but it will contain only one or the other.
After he discharges the gun, he will not know which.
The wheel has a pointer, and whether the gun he receives will contain live
ammunition is determined by the spin of this pointer, which will spin many times on
smooth bearings, and land either within the red or the blue, although John Q. will not be
able to see which. If John Q. decides to play the game, whether the gun will be live will
be determined by a single spin of this wheel: if the spinner ends in red, the gun will be
live; if it points to blue, it will contain only blanks. Given the amount of red showing, he
recognizes with great clarity that if he decides to play this game he will have a 30%
chance of killing a person.
There is a second gun, unbeknownst to John Q. It is armed with live ammunition
whenever John’s gun is not. If John decides to take the gun and pull the trigger, the
person will be shot dead whether or not John’s gun was loaded or disarmed, because of
this second gun. John cannot see the person behind the screen and does not know, when
in the course of our story John takes the gun and shoots it, that the person has in fact been
killed.
One thing John has been told and what is actually true is that the game has been
set up to destroy all implicating evidence. The moment after the guns have been
discharged, both guns are dropped into a vat and melted.
Just as John Q. is preparing to leave, a police team arrives. They seize him and all
available evidence, including a videotape that has recorded John Q. reaching his hand
through the hole and discharging the gun. In the course of their investigation the police
determine that the software used to randomly “spin the wheel” was in fact working
perfectly and was indeed random, though any evidence of where the spinner “landed” has
been extinguished.
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John Q.’s attorneys contend that John’s gun was not the one used to kill the
victim. The prosecution contends that it was, and is preparing charges of first degree
murder. John’s attorneys argue that to be first degree murder, the People must prove that
it was John’s gun specifically that killed the victim. Both eventually stipulate to the fact
that there was a 30% chance that his gun was used to murder the victim.
John Q. contends that this is not sufficient proof to pass the reasonable doubt
standard and convict him of a capital crime.
The question is, what can be done then? Is it sent to a jury, whose only question
will be whether a 30% likelihood of guilt is sufficient to pass the “beyond reasonable
doubt” standard? But the standard is allegedly set by law, not by juries. Where exactly is
it written that the standard must be interpreted as greater than 30%? How are we to
proceed?
Even if there is legal evidence that the Constitution requires that the standard be
above 30%, the question is not answered. What if the wheel John Q. saw was set to
60%,? …or 90%? …or 99.9999%? Where does the Constitution require this threshold
be set?
This is a highly contrived case. It is possible there may be other more realistic
cases to be thought of. But we believe the example favors the conclusion that it is
unlikely for the courts to force a resolution of our difficulty, or not at least any time soon,
and rather that a case meeting such requirements will probably never be brought forward,
or at least not one with the clarity sufficient to adequately compel the argument for a
revised standard.

Our Solution
Our research, while it brings to light this problem with the reasonable doubt standard,
also suggests a solution. We have developed a recommendation:
We suggest that state legislatures each commission a panel to develop a
recommendation for a quantified reasonable doubt standard and that the states then enact
enabling legislation. Because revising the standard would require respecting societal
norms – specifically the willingness to tolerate both wrongful releases and wrongful
convictions – we recommend participation of the public, perhaps through open hearings.
We further recommend that the panel include the highest quality legal minds available
and in other appointments be representative in some way of the breadth of that state’s
social norms.
We recommend that each such panel deliberate a full spectrum of alternatives for
quantifying the standard, including setting different standards for different classes of
crimes. This will no doubt take them on a long journey, but their conclusions and
recommendations will need to be viewed by the legislature as valid, and right for their
state. We also recommend that legislatures “grandfather” convictions prior to the date of
implementation.
Part of any solution will no doubt be to institute educational initiatives geared at
training the jury pool at large. If such education has been initiated during the time it will
take the panel to deliver its recommendations and the legislature to act, the transition will
be smoothed. In the longer term, education through the school system may be found to
be the lasting solution to providing qualified juries.
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Public support is likely to take time. But the case for a just system is compelling.
Most compelling to a lay person, in our thinking, is the existing risk to equal protection.
Violation of equal protection will probably be seen as constituting the most egregious
assault on the sensibilities of society. The notion that people are treated differently simply
because of lack of clarity in the law is distasteful. Nonetheless, we think a solution that
secures due process, not just equal protection, will be asked for as well.

Objection!
Several objections have been raised to our proposal.
1. You can’t put a number on that.
It is difficult for some to imagine that even their deepest and most subtle feelings
can be translated into a number. But we would tell them that they every day make little
decisions based on their hidden assessments of subtle and complex conditions. And that
whether or not they are aware of it, they are quantitatively gauging the possible outcomes
of their choices continuously. The quantifications they make are already there and only
need to be extracted, we would say. We have found no instance of being unable to
convince people, given willingness to learn about it, that they can quantify the most
“imponderable” uncertainties: whether it will rain on this day a month from now; whether
a particular sports team will reach the championship; whether a loved one will survive a
dangerous illness; or will marry another; whether a stock price will move to a certain
level; or whether, to put the sharpest point on it, a particular jury will deliver a conviction
or not.
The use of subjective probabilities in the criminal justice system is not without
precedent. We have used this methodology to create software that is currently in use in a
California superior court public defender’s office. The software involves the use of a
probability wheel, used by defense attorneys to assess the likelihood of favorable (or
adverse) verdicts. We believe others will follow and that the public and legal
professionals will in due course familiarize themselves with the concepts and grow
comfortable that it is entirely possible, and indeed easy, to quantify subjective
uncertainty.
2. It will throw us into chaos: everyone will demand retrials.
Legislation enacted by the states could contain provisions that “grandfather” past
application of the reasonable doubt standard. The question then is whether such
legislation would be deemed constitutional.
There is precedent for the United States Supreme Court to allow changes of a
similar nature to apply but not retroactively. In Schriro v. Summerlin,36 the Court
determined that state courts are constitutionally required to have a jury decide the
sentence for a first-degree murder conviction, not a judge, but that their ruling did not
apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review at that time. Importantly for
our situation however, the ruling was explicitly authorized on the basis that it was not a
“watershed rule of criminal procedure.” The Court defined a “watershed” rule as one
“without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.”37
(italics original) The Court was split 5 to 4 on whether the ruling was a “watershed”
36
37

Schriro v. Summerlin, No. 03-526, slip op. (2004).
Id. at 4.

- 16 -

ruling. In our case, it is entirely unclear whether a ruling on such a change as we propose
would amount to a “watershed” ruling in the eyes of the Supreme Court.
The rule change was also seen to be “procedural,” not “substantive.” New
substantive rules generally apply retroactively; new rules of procedure generally do not
unless they are “watershed.” A rule is substantive rather than procedural “if it alters the
range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes,”38 whereas “[i]n contrast,
rules that regulate only the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability are
procedural.”39 (italics original) Thus a change such as we contemplate is arguably
procedural and could be applied non-retroactively.
In a prior rule change they also deemed “procedural,” the Supreme Court found in
DeStafano v. Woods,40 where the Court refused to give retroactive effect to Duncan v.
Louisiana,41 that “the values implemented by the right to a jury trial would not
measurably be served by requiring retrial of all persons convicted in the past by
procedures not consistent with the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.”42 Furthermore,
Justice Breyer in Schriro v. Summerlin noted that “important interests argue against, and
indeed generally forbid, retroactive application of new procedural rules,” 43 and includes
among these interests “the fact that society does not have endless resources to spend upon
retrials.”44 Clearly there are costs and benefits that must be weighed against each other.
But should events come to such a juncture, any costs are easily argued to be
bearable when weighed against the right for all future generations to have criminal cases
decided “accurately and with the precision owed to those whose liberty or life is at
risk.”45
3. Jurors should be the ones deciding the standard of proof.
In raising this objection, people mean one of two things. In the first instance, they
mean jurors should be setting the level for the standard that is appropriate. In the second
instance, they mean jurors should decide what the reasonable doubt standard means.
In the first instance, the current jury instructions would have to be abandoned.
Jurors can determine an appropriate standard only by considering the consequences and
utilities of their verdict, but today they are barred from doing this. And were the
instructions changed so that they are not barred from it, the requirement that the standard
be “beyond a reasonable doubt” would be redundant. As shown in Appendix A, jurors
need only consider the utilities of verdict outcomes (whether their personal utilities or
utilities reflecting their beliefs about societal values would be a matter for debate) to
determine the implied threshold of proof. (Not that they would do an explicit calculation,
but that these utilities are all they need be thinking about when deciding a standard.) If
“reasonable doubt” is nonetheless retained in the instructions, it must be defined, if it is to
retain any rational meaning at all, as something like “the degree of certainty that you
believe should be required of the government in this case,” to conscript language offered
38
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(and rejected) by Lillquist.46 It is a solution, but one that in effect discards any standard
of proof that is remotely objective or replicable from jury to jury. The consequence, as
we have argued, is that such a solution violates due process and equal protection.
In the second instance, jurors would be asked to weigh the evidence, without
consideration of the consequences, and decide if the weight of evidence exceeds the
stated standard. One could visualize jury instructions that would direct individual jurors
to decide what “reasonable doubt” about the evidence “means to you.” But this creates a
logical conundrum. I can only assign meaning to a word if I know what others mean by
it. Once I am aware that other thoughtful individuals ascribe radically different
interpretations to the phrase “reasonable doubt” I am at a complete loss as to how to
ascribe meaning to it for myself. The word “meaning” can be the legitimate subject of
semantic and epistemological debate, but one thing it certainly implies is “meaning held
in common.” Once individuals abandon the idea that words carry a common meaning, all
hope for rational societal discourse is abandoned along with it.
The problem in this instance might not be so serious were individuals to interpret
the meaning of “reasonable doubt” in roughly similar ways, but our results demonstrate
that the differences in perceived meaning span several orders of magnitude (powers of
ten). Because I have no idea what it means for others, I can have no idea what it logically
means “for me.” It is clear the phrase “reasonable doubt” has no meaning in any
practical sense of the word “meaning.” This proposal to have jurors interpret it “for
themselves” is a logical cul-de-sac from which the only exit is quantifying the standard.
With quantification, what you mean by “reasonable doubt” and what I mean by it is
precise and identical. You and I ascribe a common meaning to it, and we can rationally
communicate with one another. Most importantly, I know how to assign it meaning and
work with it, and with you. The conclusion is, of course, that allowing jurors to decide
“for themselves” the meaning of “reasonable doubt” is neither a logical nor a practical
possibility.
Once jurors begin realizing this logical conundrum, they will throw up their hands
at what is being asked of them. The only jurors left will be those who have abandoned
logic and rationality, hardly the ideal prescription for due process and equal protection.
4. Trials will become like computers and jurors like calculators.
The role of the juror will stay effectively unchanged. Jurors will still be required
to do the hardest task of all, which is to absorb all the evidence, the demeanor of
witnesses, and the arguments of the attorneys, and form out of that a judgment as to the
likelihood of guilt of the defendant. The only change will be to take that judgment and
compare it to a truly objective standard of proof, to see if their judgment passes the
required threshold. It is still a sacred and heavy duty, but it will now be a clearer, more
logically accomplished one.
Some worry that this change will cause trials to become non-stop parades of
statistical and other experts toting endless tedious charts, and that the role of the jury will
either become one of making complex mathematical judgments, or simply be reduced to
making calculations. To attorneys that pursue such a strategy we would caution that only
to the extent the evidence directly affects the juror’s final weighed-in assessment of the
likelihood of guilt will such strategies prove effective. To the extent they do, they belong
46
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in the courtroom. But the juror’s final weighed-in assessment will undoubtedly contain
many elements and will be accomplished by a process more akin to intuition than to
mathematical reasoning. It is only at the last step, when the juror’s final weighed-in
assessment is quantified, that anything resembling mathematics is required – and even
here a juror needs no knowledge of mathematics or statistics to deliver a quantification
using our methods.
5. If it’s such a big problem, why hasn’t it surfaced before?
Two reasons: one, no case meeting the strict requirements of a clear test has come
before the courts; and two, no one with legislative authority has to date seriously
considered the indisputable evidence (such as ours) that jurors have such difficulty
interpreting the standard, nor the far-reaching consequences of this.
6. It has worked for hundreds of years.
This is the most emotionally arresting of the objections. At first glance, it is
deeply compelling. But the fact of the matter is, to the extent defendants have been
sentenced or released according to a flawed and imprecise standard, it is not at all clear
that it has “worked” as society would like it to work. And certainly if some citizens have
been judged according to a different standard than others, who would not call for a
change to be made?

A Note on Other Standards of Proof
Not all standards of proof currently in use suffer from the same ambiguity as reasonable
doubt, but some do. The standard in civil cases, “preponderance of the evidence” has the
happy characteristic of being defined mathematically on its face. Since the English word
“preponderance” means “having greater weight,” it is safe to conclude that subjective
likelihood of liability in the mind of the juror need only be anything exceeding 50% to
deliver a verdict of liable.
“Clear and convincing evidence” is more troublesome. About all that can be said
quantitatively about this is that, judging from its use, it must reflect a threshold
somewhere between the 50% level of “preponderance of the evidence” and whatever
probability “beyond a reasonable doubt” might be deemed to carry (a problem in itself, as
we have shown). A case can surely be made that the “clear and convincing evidence”
standard needs to be quantified too.

Conclusion
We raise a problem and propose a solution. We believe the case for quantifying the
reasonable doubt standard is a logical slam dunk: it is necessary to overcome problems of
equal protection and due process and to avoid a logical conundrum for jurors; it is
sensible; and it is practical to implement. It is far from clear whether society has the
desire, or the will, to make such a foundational change in the jury process. But we
believe that as more become educated in the language of probability and in critical
quantitative thinking, not only will they desire change but will compel it. Whether in
two, five, or fifty years, we submit that it is clear society will, of unavoidable necessity,
come to terms with this problem and create quantitative standards of proof.
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Appendix A: Why Jurors cannot use a “Flexible” (Decision Theoretic)
Approach
The standard decision theoretic structure for determining a logically consistent standard
of proof is usually credited to Tribe (1971a, 1971b)47. This structure can be illustrated as
follows:

Figure 2. Determining the Standard of Proof
This structure shows a decision (convict, acquit), an uncertainty as to whether the
defendant is in fact guilty or innocent, and a set of “utilities” (or “disutilities”) on each of
the four possible outcomes. Tribe’s insight is that jurors (or the state legislature, in our
construct) should set the standard of proof ( p * ) at a level such that they are indifferent
between convicting and acquitting. In decision theoretic terms, this means setting p *
such that the “expected” (probability-weighted) utilities of each decision alternative are
equal. Mathematically, the expected utility of convicting is E (uc ) = p * ucg + (1 p*)uci ,
and the expected utility of acquitting is E (ua ) = p * uag + (1 p*)uai . If the four utilities
are known, the equation E (uc ) = E (ua ) can be solved, with a little algebra, to yield the
breakeven probability that gives this indifference point between convicting and
acquitting:
uai uci
p* =
(ucg uci ) + (uau ucu )
Given these utilities on the outcome, p * is the logically consistent standard of proof.
The problem with this approach is not theoretical, but legal. As shown
previously, jury instructions prohibit the juror from placing any value on two of these
47
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utilities. Here’s why: consider first the (dis)utility of wrongfully convicting an innocent
defendant, uci .
This utility will inevitably be a function of the punishment,
uci = f ( punishment ) . That is, jurors, if they reflect social values, will weigh the disutility
of a wrongful conviction for murder different from the disutility of a wrongful conviction
for shoplifting, which carry different punishments. But jurors are prohibited from
considering the punishment “in any way.”48 Similarly, the utility of a rightful conviction
will in general be weighed differently for murder than for shoplifting. So these utilities,
to the juror, are indeterminate. This creates a fundamental problem: jurors cannot assess
the appropriate standard of proof with two variables in the above equation being
indeterminate.
This means jurors cannot logically create a “flexible” standard based on the
particular case, given the legal constraints. However, there is nothing to prevent state
legislatures from creating such standards. While we do not suggest that legislatures
should necessarily quantify these utilities to reach their determinations on quantified
standards of proof, we do argue that this structure represents the complete set of
considerations they must deliberate.

Appendix B: The Probability Wheel
The probability wheel is a tool developed by Dr. Carl Spetzler, co-founder of Strategic
Decisions Group headquartered in Palo Alto, California. The tool presents people with a
series of hypothetical “bets,” from which subjects can extract numerical assessments of
confidence. Once the bets have been completed, people agree that the numbers they
arrive at reflect all the nuances they want to consider, including knowledge, intuition and
even feelings about any given possible event. The event can be, in particular, the event
that a defendant committed a crime.
The probability wheel is similar to a pie chart containing two adjustable colors. It
can show all red, or it can show mostly red with a slim pie-slice of blue, or any other
proportion of red to blue. On the back is a scale that tells what percentage of the wheel is
showing red at any given time. Attached to the center of the wheel is a pointer, which
can be spun much like the pointer in a board game.
Suppose the subject is considering: how confident am I that this particular
defendant is guilty? To help the subject quantify her answer, she plays a game that
involves making a large (though fictitious) bet. The player can choose to place her bet in
one of two ways: she can put her money on the probability wheel or on a “clairvoyant.”
The clairvoyant, for purposes of the game, is a hypothetical person who can see into the
situation and know with absolute certainty what has transpired. In our case, we could
postulate to the subject as our “clairvoyant” the existence of a videotape that shows with
undisputed clarity the crime that has occurred for which the defendant is on trial.
The rewards are as follows: if the player chooses to bet on the wheel and the
pointer ends up on red, she will win $100 million. If the pointer ends up on blue, she will
win nothing. Alternatively, if the player chooses to bet on the clairvoyant, and the
clairvoyant (videotape) reveals that the defendant indeed committed the crime, the player
wins $100 million. If the videotape reveals that the defendant did not, the player wins
48
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nothing. The question for the player, at each stage in the game, is whether to bet on the
wheel or the clairvoyant so as to maximize her chance of winning. Note that the reward
structure is irrelevant, so long as the reward structure is the same for both alternatives.
The reward could be “you get to live” and the cost could be “you are shot dead.” The
objective is to focus attention on the reward structure as if it were real.
At the beginning of the betting the subject will not be able to state her true
confidence level as a percentage, so she first considers some extreme bets, setting the
wheel at say 100 percent red and 0 percent blue. Then she asks herself: would I rather
bet my money that the spinner will end up on red, or that the videotape will reveal that
the defendant committed the crime.
A quick glance at the wheel makes it clear to this player that the odds are
overwhelming for the spinner to end on red. If, by contrast, she thinks there is only about
a 60 percent chance that the videotape will reveal guilt, she will quickly decide she has a
better chance of winning her $100 million by betting on the wheel.
Next, she adjusts the wheel to the opposite extreme: 0 percent red and 100 percent
blue. This time the player perceives the assurance that the spinner will end up in blue;
she opts for the clairvoyant (videotape), which now seems a safer bet. From this point, a
series of increasingly fine adjustments is made, much like the adjustments that take place
in an ophthalmologist’s offices. The patient being fitted for eyeglasses is asked to read
an eye chart through lenses of differing strengths – stronger, then less strong. The subject
continues to adjust the amount of red on the wheel, each time asking herself to choose
whether she prefers to bet her money on the wheel or the hypothetical videotape. Each
time she finds herself choosing the wheel, she decreases the amount of red and asks
again. Each time she chooses the videotape, she increases the amount of red and asks
again. When the amount of red showing leaves her just as willing to bet on the wheel as
on the videotape – when, in other words she is indifferent about her choice of bets – then
her degree of confidence has been quantified. It takes about twenty minutes to teach
people the probability wheel technique.
Other methods, just as simple, can be used in place of the probability wheel. If
the probability is a very small one – such as if the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard
were to be set at a high number like 99.9%, supplementary methods are required to
develop the individual’s assessment. These methods, too, involve hypothetical bets, but
clearly visualized ones.
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